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Paper discusses topical problems of preserving and further strengthening tolerance in 
Georgia as an attribute of contemporary Georgian society. An interplay between 
religious and ethnic aspects of conflict is a primary focus of the paper. It is argued 
that despite the rarity of religion-driven conflicts between different ethnic groups, 
there is an acute need for preventive measures to avert conflict in the future. Effective 
and coordinated efforts on the part of international organizations and individual 
governments are seen as of increasing importance as they support Georgia’s political 
stability and economic growth. 
 
Ethnicity is closely correlated with religion in Georgia. However, Georgia is 
outstanding for the absence of cause-effect relation between religion and ethnic 
conflict. Cases that evidence religion-ridden confrontation between different ethnic 
groups are hardly detectable in Georgia’s history. Paradoxically, however, Georgia’s 
modern history is rich in conflicts both on religious and ethnic grounds. But this has 
not prevented politicians of modern times from speculating on Georgians’ tolerance. 
Indeed, it is more than a decade that Georgian authorities have been promoting a 
thesis about extraordinary tolerance of the nation to alien ethnic groups and religions. 
The most frequently cited example that serves as one of the apt illustrations of the 
legacy of Georgians’ tolerance is Maidani, a patch of land in the very downtown 
Tbilisi, where next to the Georgian Orthodox Church nobly stand Armenian Apostolic 
Church, a Synagogue and a Mosque. Although this in fact has made Maidani 
Georgia’s important touristic destination, similar examples are common too elsewhere 
in the country. Still, some experts and media commentators tend to view the 
mentioned thesis about Georgians’ tolerance as a major propagandistic trick of the 
central government aimed at molding the favorable international public opinion. This 
is partly true, since Georgia has lost two secessionist wars in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, mainly due to Russian involvement, and therefore securing international 
support in winning back peacefully these territories has been regarded as a primary 
policy issue. Nevertheless, the skeptics challenge the popular view about Georgians’ 
tolerance by pointing at the mentioned cases in recent times of ultranationalistic 
policies and infringement upon freedom of religion. 
 
 
Dangerous Convictions 
 
Following the collapse of the communist ideology in Georgia on the threshold of the 
1980s and 1990s a pressing need to fill the gap has been created. This was especially 
necessary since the national-independence movement, headed by Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, in its efforts to lead the nation towards liberation from Soviet 
domination has sought for patterns of self-identification for Georgian nation. This 
quest for new identity has resulted in the emergence of two major convictions that 
later on largely foreordained the course of events. First, a discourse of civil or human 
rights that would express a right of national self-determination for its minorities had 
not been developed. Instead, the non-Georgians were constructed as “foreigners,” 
recent arrivals living on authentically Georgian land, and as more loyal to the imperial 
Russian power than to Georgia.1 Therefore, the new Georgian statehood should have 
been built based on ‘ethnic purification’. Subsequently, as Z. Gamsakhurdia and his 
followers ascended the power, this conviction has become the new Georgian 
government’s policy. 
 
The other conviction that too had been nourished by nationalistic sentiments was 
Georgian Orthodoxy as the sole religious belief for ‘genuine Georgians’. This outlook 
had much to do with the important role that the Georgian Orthodox Church had 
played as the major uniting factor in most critical times throughout the nation’s 
history. Although internally the Georgians were not ready to go back instantly to the 
bosom of the Church after long years of infidelity under the Soviet system, for the 
masses the conversion into believers had been perceived as the spirit of the times. 
Being religious had become fashionable as it allowed for emulating the popular 
leaders of the time.2 
 
The mentioned outlooks had quickly gained popularity. Not surprisingly, in due 
course both convictions have had significant impact on subsequent policy design 
process, which in most cases led to negative consequences. 
 
 
From Ethnic Nationalism to Ethnic Conflict 
 
It happened so that the ethnic nationalism as the official ideology had instantly 
resulted in hostile policies against ethnic minorities, and most notably against titular 
ethnic groups in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Local separatists and their Russian 
patrons on their part too have added fuel to the fire in their efforts to pursue the goals 
predetermined by both history and geopolitics.3 First serious confrontation took place 
in South Ossetia. In January 1991 as several thousand Georgian troops entered 
Tskhinvali, an administrative center of South Ossetia, a year of chaos started with 
further escalation into urban warfare with sporadic Russian involvement. One year 
later an agreement was reached between the parties that had brought about the 
ceasefire, but the war’s consequences were devastating: some 1,000 dead, 100 
missing, extensive destruction of homes and infrastructure,4 and around 30,000 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).5 
 
In the meantime Gamsakhurdia was overthrown by a civil war within Georgia and the 
former Foreign Minister of the USSR, Eduard Shevardnadze, was invited back from 
Moscow to stabilize the situation. But little progress has been made since 1992 to 
bring Ossetians and Georgians closer together. President Saakashvili tried to break a 
twelve-year deadlock and take another step to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity by 
undermining the regime in Tskhinvali, but seriously miscalculated.6 Later the 
approach has changed. Georgia has devised a peace plan implying three-stage strategy 
of conflict settlement.7 The onus is on Georgia, with help from its international 
partners, to increase the security and confidence of people living in the zone of 
conflict, promote economic rehabilitation and development, ensure the right of 
Ossetians to return to South Ossetia and Georgia proper, and create arrangements 
guaranteeing South Ossetia effective autonomy.8 
 
According to general assessment the conflict in Abkhazia is more deep-rooted and has 
brought about incomparably more devastating results both in terms of Georgian 
nation building and inter-ethnic relations between Georgians and Abkhaz. During the 
war in 1992-1993 with Russian support, the Abkhaz were able to defeat the Georgian 
forces. About 300,000 people had lost their homes and deep resentments had been 
created. Many of the grievances and ambitions developed during the war remain 
tough obstacles to peace. Unless they are addressed, efforts to re-integrate Abkhazia 
into Georgia are almost certain to lead again to violence. The major hindrance to 
achieving peaceful settlement of the conflict is a lack of vision on how to settle the 
conflict. Over the past decade inconsistent policies that derived from mentioned 
absence of the vision have led to greater alienation of the Abkhaz and Georgians. 
Politically the sides in the conflict are nowhere closer to each other as their stances 
have become radically diverged compared to the years immediately after the cessation 
of hostilities in 1993.9 
 
Another historical-geographic area in southern Georgia, Javakheti, is also deemed to 
be fraught with the potential for conflict. This stems from the dominance of the 
Armenian population in this part of Georgia characterized by widespread poverty and 
social insecurity, high level of corruption and organized crime, large-scale illegal 
storage and possession of firearms, and the weakness of national security 
mechanisms. First signs of potential conflict were registered in the early 1990s. At 
that time, Georgia witnessed two local conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and a 
civil war culminating in the capital Tbilisi. However, with the exception of several 
political demonstrations the situation in Javakheti did not erupt into large-scale 
violence or inter-ethnic conflict. These demonstrations were primarily motivated by 
demands for autonomy, which were supported by Armenian nationalist organizations. 
However, even during that period, the population of Javakheti did not support more 
extremist calls for secession from Georgia.10 Subsequently, since 1999, the situation 
in Javakheti has again started worsen. There was a new wave of public protests over 
deteriorating economic conditions, irregular electricity supplies, and growing 
speculation over the withdrawal of the Russian military base.11 Currently, the central 
government is in control of the situation, however, the potential for conflict is still 
real.12 
 
Over time, however, the radical nationalistic attitudes gave way to more liberal views. 
This tendency has become even more evident recently. Georgia’s Rose Revolution 
has brought to power political forces that are increasingly aware of unavoidability of 
peaceful means of resolving the ethnic differences. High popular support enables the 
incumbent authorities to effectively advocate for seeking peaceful political solution 
and suppress the ultranationalistic sentiments in Georgian society. Yet some new 
economic policies of Georgia’s new government have caused anxiety in certain 
peripheries such as Azeri-populated Kvemo Kartli. Azeris have always been and still 
are one of the most loyal ethnic minorities to the Georgian state. Apart from history 
and geopolitics, personal friendship of former presidents of Georgia and Azerbaijan 
has significantly contributed to this loyalty. Nonetheless, as the new government took 
active measures against smuggling practices, including in Kvemo Kartli, local 
population has perceived this as an attempt of ethnic discrimination. Numerous cases 
of confiscation of smuggled goods have caused protests and clashes with law 
enforcement agencies. Apparently, Georgian government needs to make greater civil 
integration of Azeris in Kvemo Kartli a priority so as to avoid deterioration of existing 
inter-ethnic harmony. 
 
 
Taming Religious Extremism 
 
Despite a general tolerance toward minority religious groups citizens remained very 
apprehensive towards Protestants and other nontraditional religions, which were seen 
as taking advantage of the population’s economic hardships by gaining membership 
by providing economic assistance to converts. These groups were viewed as a threat 
to the national Church and the country’s cultural values and argued that foreign 
Christian missionaries should confine their activities to non-Christian areas. These 
views had gradually evolved into aggressive attitudes. 
 
Unlike ultranationalistic attitudes the religious intolerance had become apparent in the 
late 1990s as violent attacks on adherents of non-traditional religious groups, such as 
Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Evangelists, Pentecostals, and Hare Krishnas began to 
take place. These groups faced hate speech and violent attacks by organized groups of 
Orthodox Christian vigilantes. The state failed to respond adequately, and sometimes 
even cooperated in the attacks, which consequently became more frequent and 
pervasive, spreading from Tbilisi to many other regions throughout Georgia. The 
attacks and hate speech faded prior to the November 2003 elections, leading to 
speculation about how closely the government controlled the violence. In 2004, there 
were some reports of intimidation and violence against religious minorities, although 
at significantly reduced levels to previous years. 
 
The President, the National Security Council Secretary, and the Government 
Ombudsman have been effective advocates for religious freedom and have made 
numerous public speeches and appearances in support of minority religious groups. 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Procuracy have become more active in the 
protection of religious freedom and have pursued criminal cases against Orthodox 
extremists for their continued attacks against religious minorities. 
 
While less harassment was reported in recent times, the problems remain. There are 
no laws regarding the registration of religious organizations. The Georgian Orthodox 
Church remained the only religion with legal status in the country. The new 
Government has not addressed a previous draft law to allow for registration or 
proposed other changes. Unregistered religious groups are not officially permitted to 
rent office space, acquire construction rights, import literature, or represent the 
international church. Also, the Roman Catholic Church and the Armenian Apostolic 
Church were unable to secure the return of churches closed or given to the Georgian 
Orthodox Church during the Soviet period. Additionally, the Ministry of Education 
requires all 4th grade students to take a “Religion and Culture” class, which covers 
the history of major religions. Many parents complain of teachers focusing solely on 
the Georgian Orthodox Church. The Church has a consultative role in all curriculum 
development.13 
 
Interestingly, however, there has been no evidence that any misunderstanding has 
ever taken place with traditional religions present in Georgia, including Islam. This 
suggests that attributing the abovementioned cases of religious intolerance to 
xenophobia and religious nationalism would be incorrect. Probably, one may assume 
that we have been witnessing the manifestation of the natural instinct of survival as 
the Georgian Orthodox Church had used both overt and implicit means to prevail over 
increasingly influential non-traditional religious denominations. 
  
What Next? 
 
Georgia is at a unique and critically important moment in its history. Recent 
phenomenal changes in Georgia’s political landscape have opened the window of 
opportunity for building a viable democracy and a rule of law state. Upgrading the 
standards of respecting the human rights, as well as peaceful solution of the existing 
ethnic differences emerge now as most urgent challenges. Success and/or failure to 
address these challenges will largely determine not only the fate of the Georgian state, 
but also the stability of current political regime and its durability. Georgia’s problems, 
however, are so broad, deep, and encompassing that it will be hard for Georgia’s new 
government to move forward without the energetic participation of the international 
community. 
 
The fundamental problem that needs immediate and concerted efforts on the part of 
the international community is regional tensions and ethnic conflicts as they serve as 
major hindrances to political stability and economic development. This is particularly 
important because against the background of decreasing ethnic radicalism in Georgia 
the remaining obstructive policies of Russia limits Georgia’s own resources to ensure 
peaceful settlement of conflicts. 
 
Past experience of international involvement demonstrates that there is an acute need 
for more active participation in the settlement of ethnic disputes. This is prompted 
from the following lessons learned: 
 
    * There is a lack of coordination between international actors (both international 
organizations and individual governments) preventing from more effective utilization 
of diplomatic as well as financial resources; 
    * Multilateral settings of political settlement of conflicts, such as UN Security 
Council or Friends of Secretary General on Abkhazia/Georgia, proved to be 
ineffective because of Russian veto; 
    * UNOMIG and CIS-led Peacekeeping Operations did not bring tangible results 
due to either limited mandate or lack of motivation. 
 
There is a need for closer collaboration between the West and Russia. Questions of 
Georgia’s accession to the EU and NATO should not be allowed to undermine 
cooperation with Russia. More emphasis should be put on pushing Russia towards 
more constructive participation on bilateral basis (e.g. U.S.-Russia dialog, EU-Russia 
dialog, etc.). 
 
Also, advocacy for and cultivation of Western liberal values in the separatist regions 
would help create and alternative to the existing ‘Russian choice’. Increased injections 
of understanding that the Western community as an ultimate political destination 
would better ensure realization of national goals of Abkhaz and Ossets. This will 
contribute to constructive dialog with Georgian authorities provided that Georgia on 
its part will be making practical steps towards approaching the same destination. 
 
In the realm of internal politics the international donors should address the issues of 
nationalism and minorities so as to rule out in future reemergence of religious 
intolerance and inter-ethnic frictions. For that reason a wide-ranging debate on the 
relationship between citizenship, nationalism and ethnic identity should be 
encouraged in all areas. The position of minorities, including non-traditional religious 
groups, should be considered in all assistance programs. 
 
Finally, a care should be taken of those most affected by conflict. As these are the 
people representing the poorest sectors of society, chances raise for increased 
aggressiveness toward de facto seceded societies. Therefore their voice should be 
strengthened through civil society, through micro-finance programs and through 
developing the leadership of women. 
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